KOR

e-Article

Why START. [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks treaty]
Document Type
Journal Article
Author
Source
Arms Control Today; (United States); 21:3
Subject
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY ARMS CONTROL
TREATIES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
MISSILES
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
POLITICAL ASPECTS
USA
USSR
VERIFICATION
ASIA
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES
EUROPE
INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS
NORTH AMERICA
WEAPONS 350101* -- Arms Control-- Policy, Negotiations, & Legislation-- Treaties-- (1987-)
290600 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy
Language
English
ISSN
0196-125X
Abstract
Barring some major unexpected downturn in US-Soviet relations, it seems likely that the long-awaited Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaty will be signed sometime in 1991. Under negotiation for the past nine years, public acceptance and Senate approval of a START treaty will be facilitated by the generally less confrontational East-West relationship which has evolved over that time, by the growing constraints on the US defense budget, and by the obvious merits of the treaty itself. Not only will the nearly complete START treaty be an extremely useful and powerful arms control agreement, it is also decidedly advantageous to US security interests. First and foremost, a START treaty will cap and reduce the steady buildup of nuclear weapons that has characterized the last 30 years of the US-Soviet strategic relationship. As a result of the basic outline originally agreed to at the Reykjavik summit, START will take a 25 to 35 percent bite out of existing nuclear arsenals, impose approximately a 50 percent cut in overall Soviet ballistic missile warheads and throw-weight (lifting power or payload capacity), and produce an exact 50 percent cut in Soviet SS-18 missiles.