Catalog
| LDR | 01358namua2200265 a 4500 | ||
| 001 | 0092556367▲ | ||
| 005 | 20180519014619▲ | ||
| 008 | 141219s2014 ko b 000 0 eng d▲ | ||
| 040 | ▼a221016▼c221016▲ | ||
| 082 | 0 | 4 | ▼a332.7▼221▲ |
| 090 | ▼a332.7▼bS698c▲ | ||
| 100 | 1 | ▼aSong, Jae Eun▲ | |
| 245 | 1 | 0 | ▼aCompetitive search equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information and limited commitment /▼cJae Eun Song.▲ |
| 260 | ▼aSeoul :▼bKorea Institute of Finance,▼c2014▲ | ||
| 300 | ▼a43 p. ;▼c26 cm.▲ | ||
| 490 | 1 | ▼aKIF working paper ;▼v14-14▲ | |
| 504 | ▼aIncludes bibliographical references▲ | ||
| 520 | 3 | ▼aThis paper develops a model of a competitive search credit market under hidden information and limited commitment. Using the model, it provides a theoretical account that links time delays and costs in financial intermediation as well as lack of collateral to the distribution of credit supply and interest rate spreads. The link sheds light on and explains the possibility of pure credit rationing due to the credit frictions. It also demonstrates the possibility of contract dispersion among homogeneous borrowers.▲ | |
| 710 | 2 | ▼aKorea Institute of Finance▲ | |
| 830 | 0 | ▼aWorking paper(Korea Institute of Finance) ;▼v14-14▲ | |
| 910 | 2 | ▼aKIF.▲ | |
| 910 | 2 | ▼a한국금융연구원▲ | |
| 949 | ▼aKorea Institute of Finance working paper▲ | ||
| 990 | ▼a정영주▲ | ||
| 999 | ▼a정영주▼c정영주▲ |
Competitive search equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information and limited commitment
Document Type
Foreign Book
Title
Competitive search equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information and limited commitment / Jae Eun Song.
Author
Corporate Name
Publication
Seoul : Korea Institute of Finance , 2014
Physical Description
43 p. ; 26 cm.
Series Title
Bibliography Note
Includes bibliographical references
Summary Note
This paper develops a model of a competitive search credit market under hidden information and limited commitment. Using the model, it provides a theoretical account that links time delays and costs in financial intermediation as well as lack of collateral to the distribution of credit supply and interest rate spreads. The link sheds light on and explains the possibility of pure credit rationing due to the credit frictions. It also demonstrates the possibility of contract dispersion among homogeneous borrowers.
Call Number
332.7 S698c
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