학술논문

Cryptanalysis of Farash et al.'s SIP authentication protocol
Document Type
Article
Source
International Journal of Dynamical Systems and Differential Equations; 2018, Vol. 8 Issue: 1-2 p77-94, 18p
Subject
Language
ISSN
17523583; 17523591
Abstract
Session initiation protocol (SIP) is the most popular signalling protocol used in order to establish, maintain and terminate multimedia sessions between different participants. Nowadays, the security of SIP is becoming more and more important. Authentication is the most important security service required for SIP. To provide secure communication, many SIP authentication schemes have been proposed. Very recently, Farash et al. proposed a new SIP authentication protocol based on elliptic curve cryptography. They proved that their scheme is secured against different attacks. However, in this paper we show that Farash et al.'s protocol suffers from Denning-Sacco attacks and denial of service attacks. Moreover, we propose our solution to solve the problem. The security analysis shows that our proposed solution is more secure and can resist to various attacks.