학술논문

Making sense of the subjective experience of others
Document Type
article
Source
Revista Latinoamericana de Psicopatologia Fundamental. June 2020 23(2)
Subject
Psychopathology
knowledge of persons
intersubjectivity
criterion
Language
English
ISSN
1415-4714
Abstract
In this article, we address some conceptual issues that are logically prior to the constitution of any psychopathology. We explore ontological and epistemological aspects of subjective experience, rejecting both Cartesianism and behaviorism, and favoring the Wittgensteinian notion of criterial support instead. Then, we discuss the disanalogy between knowledge of other minds and our knowledge of anything else. Based on the arguments by Eilan’s that the “communication claim” should replace the “observation claim,” we defend that there is a kind of knowledge that is irreducibly founded on intersubjectivity (that is, knowledge of persons is knowledge for two) and point out to implications it may have for psychopathology.