학술논문

Accountable Care Organizations in California: Market Forces at Work?
Document Type
article
Source
Journal of Health Politics Policy and Law. 40(4)
Subject
Clinical Research
Accountable Care Organizations
California
Cost Control
Delivery of Health Care
Integrated
Economic Competition
Humans
Managed Care Programs
Medicare
Private Sector
Public Sector
Residence Characteristics
United States
accountable care organizations
Affordable Care Act
market concentration
Public Health and Health Services
Policy and Administration
Law
Health Policy & Services
Language
Abstract
Accountable care organizations (ACOs), one of the most recent and promising health care delivery innovations, encourage care coordination among providers. While ACOs hold promise for decreasing costs by reducing unnecessary procedures, improving resource use as a result of economies of scale and scope, ACOs also raise concerns about provider market power. This study examines the market-level competition factors that are associated with ACO participation and the number of ACOs. Using data from California, we find that higher levels of preexisting managed care leads to higher ACO entry and enrollment growth, while hospital concentration leads to fewer ACOs and lower enrollment. We find interesting results for physician market power - markets with concentrated physician markets have a smaller share of individuals in commercial ACOs but a larger number of commercial ACO organizations. This finding implies smaller ACOs in these markets.