부산대학교 도서관

This chapter defends a variation of conceptualism, the view that all meaningful experience is conceptually mediated. The development of new moral concepts, it argues, cannot start from a conceptually schemeless “given,” but from within an existing conceptual inheritance. It outlines a conception of conceptual mediation that is not necessarily discursive or propositional in form, such that conceptually mediated experiences can rupture existing discursive repertoires. It develops this by considering two examples of moral concept development, concerning ‘courage’ and ‘sexual harassment’, respectively. Drawing from Charles Mills and John McDowell, it then argues that conceptualism is not only compatible with, but required for, realism about the content of experience. It argues that ideology critique remains possible without requiring a conceptually schemeless foundation, criticizing an anti-realist pragmatist alternative. Finally, it outlines a notion of epistemically productive dissonance in consciousness raising, drawing from Miranda Fricker, that helps explain the beginning stages of moral articulation.