부산대학교 도서관

This study examines the Cash-Vote divergence on the earings management of manager in the KSE regarding board structure. Empirical analysis has been performed for non-banking firms listed over the KSE from 2002 to 2006 using multiple regression. Manager’s earnings management is evaluated from discretionary accruals from Jones model(1991) and the model by Dechow et al.(1995) which modified Jones model. Cash-Vote divergence is collected from OPNI in Firm Trade Commission. The evidence presented in this study shows that the majority of the ultimate owners possesses higher voting rights than cash flow rights like prior research. Managers tend to maximize earnings management as portion of Cash-Vote divergence increases. Regarding board structure, it is shown that the influence of Cash-Vote divergence in earning management does change much depending on whether the portion of outside directors in board, the board size and the minimal required selection of outside directors.