학술논문

성과측정치, 권한위임, 그리고 성과에 관한 연구
A Study on the Performance Measures, Delegation, and Performance
Document Type
Article
Text
Source
상업경영연구(구 상업교육연구), 12/30/2008, Vol. 22, p. 201-222
Subject
성과측정치
인센티브
권한위임
성과급
성과
Performance Measures
Delegation
Incentives Design
Performance
Language
Korean
ISSN
1229-8867
Abstract
This study examines empirically the link between delegation and incentive compensation. also this study analyzes the parametric effect of incentive plan on the relationship between performance measures and delegation. Also, delegation effects on organization performance. So it is interesting to investigate whether it shows same result with the prior research or not. A research model and a hypothesis are formulated from results of prior studies. To examine these factors, we used 248 firms data by survey. This study empirically shows the impact of incentives plan not only directly but indirectly on a delegation. Delegation cause both financial measures and non-financial measures. To the result of our study were as follows. First In regard to the use of performance measures has a positive impact on delegation. Financially-based performance measures is intensively by companies that adopt a incentive plan. Second, this study found that organizational performance does affect the firms delegation. In turn, managers with more authority produce more performance. This study's findings are subject to several important caveats. First, no empirical study can simultaneously model all organizational design choices. Therefore, this study is a partial equilibrium analysis. Second, organizational design variables such as delegation, the nature of the firm's operating enviornment, and managers' risk aversion are measured with error.