학술논문
Governance of Social Welfare in Networked Markets
Document Type
Periodical
Author
Source
IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems IEEE Trans. Comput. Soc. Syst. Computational Social Systems, IEEE Transactions on. 11(1):652-659 Feb, 2024
Subject
Language
ISSN
2329-924X
2373-7476
2373-7476
Abstract
This article aims to investigate how a central authority (e.g., a government) can increase social welfare (SW) in a network of markets and firms. In these networks, modeled using a bipartite graph, firms compete with each other ` a la Cournot. Each firm can supply homogeneous goods in markets which it has access to. The central authority may take different policies for its aim. In this article, we assume that the government has a budget by which it can supply some goods and inject them into various markets. We discuss how the central authority can best allocate its budget for the distribution of goods to maximize SW. We show that the solution is highly dependent on the structure of the network. Then, using the network’s structural features, we present a heuristic algorithm for our target problem. Finally, we compare the performance of our algorithm with other heuristics with experimentation on real datasets.