학술논문

HI-SST: Safeguarding SiP Authenticity Through Secure Split-Test in Heterogeneous Integration
Document Type
Conference
Source
2024 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI (ISVLSI) ISVLSI VLSI (ISVLSI), 2024 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on. :379-384 Jul, 2024
Subject
Components, Circuits, Devices and Systems
Computing and Processing
Semiconductor device modeling
Performance evaluation
System-in-package
Chiplets
Prevention and mitigation
Supply chains
Multichip modules
Secure Heterogeneous Integration
System-in-Package (SiP)
chiplet
SiP supply chain
counterfeit SiP
Language
ISSN
2159-3477
Abstract
In response to the evolving semiconductor landscape in light of Moore's law limitations, the industry has embraced System-in-Packages (SiPs) to increase functionality density, utilizing segregated dies called chiplets on a shared interposer substrate. However, procuring chiplets from uncertain sources and lacking supply chain visibility have heightened counterfeit vulnerabilities. This paper introduces Heterogeneous Integration Secure Split-Test (HI -SST), an approach to demonstrate how mitigating out-of-spec, defective, overproduced, and remarked chiplets and SiPs can be done through secure split testing. In HI -SST, we augment SiP architectures with two new trusted components, i.e., chiplet hardware security module (CHSM) and chiplet security IP (CSIP) within chiplets to streamline the communication of security assets as well as testing and authentication. Functional locking, testing data encryption, and a remarking detection mechanism are de-veloped within the CSIP to provide mitigation against the threats above. With a detailed security and performance evaluation, we also compare HI -SST with the conventional established SST and Connecticut-SST (CSST) solutions for monolithic ICs, showing how the foundation of such a solution requires a revisit in the domain of heterogeneous integration (HI).