학술논문

Attacking Image Splicing Detection and Localization Algorithms Using Synthetic Traces
Document Type
Periodical
Source
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur. Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on. 19:2143-2156 2024
Subject
Signal Processing and Analysis
Computing and Processing
Communication, Networking and Broadcast Technologies
Forensics
Splicing
Location awareness
Training
Feature extraction
Detectors
Generators
Anti-forensics
adversarial attacks
generative adversarial networks
splicing detection and localization
Language
ISSN
1556-6013
1556-6021
Abstract
Recent advances in deep learning have enabled forensics researchers to develop a new class of image splicing detection and localization algorithms. These algorithms identify spliced content by detecting localized inconsistencies in forensic traces using Siamese neural networks, either explicitly during analysis or implicitly during training. At the same time, deep learning has enabled new forms of anti-forensic attacks, such as adversarial examples and generative adversarial network (GAN) based attacks. Thus far, however, no anti-forensic attack has been demonstrated against image splicing detection and localization algorithms. In this paper, we propose a new GAN-based anti-forensic attack that is able to fool state-of-the-art splicing detection and localization algorithms such as EXIF-Net, Noiseprint, and Forensic Similarity Graphs. This attack operates by adversarially training an anti-forensic generator against a set of Siamese neural networks so that it is able to create synthetic forensic traces. Under analysis, these synthetic traces appear authentic and are self-consistent throughout an image. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate that our attack is capable of fooling forensic splicing detection and localization algorithms without introducing visually detectable artifacts into an attacked image. Additionally, we demonstrate that our attack outperforms existing alternative attack approaches.