학술논문

Online Stackelberg learning solution for non-zero-sum games with infinite horizon cost*
Document Type
Conference
Source
2022 China Automation Congress (CAC) Automation Congress (CAC), 2022 China. :822-826 Nov, 2022
Subject
Aerospace
Communication, Networking and Broadcast Technologies
Components, Circuits, Devices and Systems
Computing and Processing
Power, Energy and Industry Applications
Robotics and Control Systems
Signal Processing and Analysis
Transportation
Asymptotic stability
Heuristic algorithms
Estimation
Games
Cost function
Mathematical models
Stability analysis
reinforcement learning
solution of Stackelberg-equilibrium
adaptive control
mixed H2/H control
Language
ISSN
2688-0938
Abstract
In this paper, we consider online integral RL to derive the optimal solution of mixed H 2 /H ∞ problem. In mixed H 2 /H ∞ control, both control input and deterministic disturbance shaped the Stackelberg game. In this model, the dynamic information is incomplete due to the complexity uncertain environment. The multi-players in this system with hierarchical structure is cooperative, moreover, an extra Lagrange multiplier is required to construct the dynamic relationship of leader and follower. The learning algorithm obtain the solutions of coupled Riccati and Hamilton-Jacobi equations online which derives the adaptive control method approximates the optimal cost function and the Stackelberg form equilibrium. The existence of incentive condition also makes the convergence of the estimation to the realistic date. Moreover, the closed-loop dynamical is guaranteed stability by using Lyapunov stability analysis.