학술논문

COVID-19 outbreak in a state prison: a case study on the implementation of key public health recommendations for containment and prevention
Document Type
article
Source
BMC Public Health. 22(1)
Subject
Epidemiology
Health Services and Systems
Public Health
Health Sciences
Clinical Research
Infectious Diseases
Prevention
Infection
Good Health and Well Being
COVID-19
Disease Outbreaks
Humans
Pandemics
Prisoners
Prisons
SARS-CoV-2
Decarceration
Policy
Vaccination
Case study
Conceptual framework
Public Health and Health Services
Health services and systems
Public health
Language
Abstract
BackgroundPeople incarcerated in US prisons have been disproportionately harmed by the COVID-19 pandemic. That prisons are such efficient superspreading environments can be attributed to several known factors: small, communal facilities where people are confined for prolonged periods of time; poor ventilation; a lack of non-punitive areas for quarantine/medical isolation; and staggeringly high numbers of people experiencing incarceration, among others. While health organizations have issued guidance on preventing and mitigating COVID-19 infection in carceral settings, little is known about if, when, and how recommendations have been implemented. We examined factors contributing to containment of one of the first California prison COVID-19 outbreaks and remaining vulnerabilities using an adapted multi-level determinants framework to systematically assess infectious disease risk in carceral settings.MethodsCase study employing administrative data; observation; and informal discussions with: people incarcerated at the prison, staff, and county public health officials.ResultsOutbreak mitigation efforts were characterized by pre-planning (e.g., designation of ventilated, single-occupancy quarantine) and a quickly mobilized inter-institutional response that facilitated systematic, voluntary rapid testing. However, several systemic- and institutional-level vulnerabilities were unaddressed hindering efforts and posing significant risk for future outbreaks, including insufficient decarceration, continued inter-facility transfers, incomplete staff cohorting, and incompatibility between built environment features (e.g., dense living conditions) and public health recommendations.ConclusionsOur adapted framework facilitates systematically assessing prison-based infectious disease outbreaks and multi-level interventions. We find implementing some recommended public health strategies may have contributed to outbreak containment. However, even with a rapidly mobilized, inter-institutional response, failure to decarcerate created an overreliance on chance conditions. This left the facility vulnerable to future catastrophic outbreaks and may render standard public health strategies - including the introduction of effective vaccines - insufficient to prevent or contain those outbreaks.