부산대학교 도서관

This chapter continues our task in Part 3 of considering the place for reasons in normative theory more broadly by considering what other normative properties or relations we can or should use to analyze reasons. Special attention is paid throughout to the constraint set by the relationship between our answer to this question and whatever answer we give to the question from Chapter 9 about what we should use reasons to analyze. Telic analyses of reasons in terms of the promotion of desires or values are considered and problems raised about the connection between these ideas and the debate between consequentialism and deontology as well as arguments for metaethical relativism and the error theory. Non-telic analysis of reasons in terms of ‘good’ are introduced, and the idea that normative reasons are in some sense good motivating reasons is explored in greater detail and connected to the Reasoning View from Chapter 8. Questions are raised about various formulations of the Reasoning View that put pressure on whether it must appeal to something that looks like reasons.