학술논문
금융소비자 보호를 위한 최적의 금융감독체계 : 통합형 vs. 쌍봉형
Optimal Framework of Financial Supervision for Consumer Protection: One peak or Twin Peaks?
Optimal Framework of Financial Supervision for Consumer Protection: One peak or Twin Peaks?
Document Type
Article
Author
Source
금융소비자연구 / Journal of Financial Consumers. Oct 31, 2017 7(1):5
Subject
Language
Korean
ISSN
2233-9892
Abstract
본 연구는 규제 외부성과 규제 불완결성을 가정한 이론모형에 기반하여 사회 최적의 금융감독체계를 도출하고 통합형과 쌍봉형 금융감독체계를 비교하였다. 그 결과, 규제 외부성이 완전히 내부화되어 규제 불완결성이 존재하지 않으면 통합형과 쌍봉형은 본질적으로 다르지 않다. 다만 이 경우 쌍봉형이 통합형보다 사회 최적을 달성하는 데 더 효율적일 수 있다. 그러나 규제 불완결성이 존재할 경우 통합형이 사회 최적을 달성하지 못하더라도 쌍봉형보다 더 효율적일 수 있다. 한편 규제 설정자에 의한 규제 불완결성은 규제 설정자로부터 독립적이고 금융감독에 대해 분명한 권한과 책임을 보유한 규제 집행자에 의해 개선 또는 제거될 수 있다. 규제 불완결성은 규제설정자뿐만 아니라 규제 집행자에 의해서도 발생할 수 있는데, 이는 규제 집행자의 지배구조를 금융감독체계에 맞게 설계할 경우 제거될 수 있다.
This study compares one-peak and twin-peaks frameworks of financial supervision based on a theoretic model under the assumptions of externalities between prudential and conduct regulations and incompleteness in regulations. The results of the study find that one peak and twin peaks are not inherently different if regulation externalities are perfectly internalized so that there is no incompleteness in regulations. Nonetheless, twin peaks could be more socially efficient than one peak in this case. If regulation incompleteness is produced by regulator, neither one peak nor twin peaks can attain social optimality but the former could be more socially efficient than the latter. The study also proves that regulation incompleteness by regulator can be improved or eliminated if supervisors are independent from regulator and have clear mandates on financial supervision. Finally, supervisors also may reproduce regulation incompleteness which could be removed by designing structural governance of supervisors corresponding to a framework of financial supervision.
This study compares one-peak and twin-peaks frameworks of financial supervision based on a theoretic model under the assumptions of externalities between prudential and conduct regulations and incompleteness in regulations. The results of the study find that one peak and twin peaks are not inherently different if regulation externalities are perfectly internalized so that there is no incompleteness in regulations. Nonetheless, twin peaks could be more socially efficient than one peak in this case. If regulation incompleteness is produced by regulator, neither one peak nor twin peaks can attain social optimality but the former could be more socially efficient than the latter. The study also proves that regulation incompleteness by regulator can be improved or eliminated if supervisors are independent from regulator and have clear mandates on financial supervision. Finally, supervisors also may reproduce regulation incompleteness which could be removed by designing structural governance of supervisors corresponding to a framework of financial supervision.