학술논문
SOBRE EL MODELO DE APRECIACIÓN DE ABUSIVIDAD EN LA LEY Nº 19.496, CON ESPECIAL REFERENCIA A SU ARTÍCULO 16 LETRA G). BASES PARA UNA DIFERENCIACIÓN ENTRE EL CONTROL DE CONTENIDO Y EL DE SORPRESIVIDAD
Document Type
research-article
Source
Revista Chilena de Derecho, 2020 Sep 01. 47(3), 785-808.
Subject
Language
Spanish; Castilian
ISSN
07160747
07183437
07183437
Abstract
A la luz de los modelos presentes en el derecho alemán y la Directiva 93/13/CEE, se analiza el modelo de apreciación de abusividad que establece el artículo 16 letra g) de la ley Nº 19.496. Se explica cómo parte de nuestra doctrina y jurisprudencia acercan el control de contenido al de sorpresividad. Se aduce que esta aproximación entraña el riesgo de desvirtuar el control de contenido, justificando la validez de cláusulas que, pese a introducir desequilibrios normativos significativos al contrato, han sido adecuadamente informadas al adherente. Se propone que la apreciación de abusividad se mantenga en los límites abstractos contemplados en la mentada 16 letra g), fundando el control de sorpresividad en otras reglas de la ley Nº 19.496 y del Código Civil.
In the light of the models found in German law and in the Directive 93/13 / EEC, is analysed the unfairness assessment model that is established in article 16 letter g) of Law No. 19,496. It is explained how part of our doctrine and jurisprudence approach the content control to the control of surprising terms. It is argued that this approach entails the risk of distorting the content control, justifying the validity of clauses that, despite introducing significant regulatory imbalances to the contract, have been adequately informed to the adherent. It is proposed that the unfairness assessment of abuse should be maintained within the abstract limits of the referred letter g), based on the surprising control in other rules of Law No. 19.496 and the Civil Code.
In the light of the models found in German law and in the Directive 93/13 / EEC, is analysed the unfairness assessment model that is established in article 16 letter g) of Law No. 19,496. It is explained how part of our doctrine and jurisprudence approach the content control to the control of surprising terms. It is argued that this approach entails the risk of distorting the content control, justifying the validity of clauses that, despite introducing significant regulatory imbalances to the contract, have been adequately informed to the adherent. It is proposed that the unfairness assessment of abuse should be maintained within the abstract limits of the referred letter g), based on the surprising control in other rules of Law No. 19.496 and the Civil Code.