부산대학교 도서관

Purpose: This research investigates whether the characteristics of corporate governance (executive compensation, board composition, ownership structure, and control) influence the sensitivity of remuneration to firms' performance, the so-called pay-performance sensitivity. Originality/value: This study brings to the literature a new perspective on the interaction of corporate governance mechanisms aligned with the concept of pay-performance sensitivity. The study shows that governance instruments are not isolated but rather interrelated and interdependent. Design/methodology/approach: The study sample was composed of Brazil 100 Index (IBRX 100) companies listed on B3 from 2014 to 2018. Data were extracted from the Economatica[R] database, and the reference forms were accessed on the Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil's (CVM) website. We use panel data regression models with fixed and random-effects models. Findings: The board composition (represented by the CEO/Chairman duality) increases the pay-performance sensitivity, while the ownership concentration reduces it. In addition, a greater presence of independent members on the board reduces the variation in executive compensation. KEYWORDS Executive compensation. Board composition. Ownership structure and control. Corporate governance. Pay-performance sensitivity. Objetivo: Esta pesquisa se propoe a investigar se as caracteristicas de governanca corporative--compensacao dos executivos, composicao do conselho de administracao e estrutura de propriedade/controle--influenciam na sensibilidade da remuneracao ao desempenho da firma, a chamada pay-performance sensitivity. Originalidade/valor: O estudo contribui ao apresentar um novo olhar sobre a interaco dos mecanismos de governanca corporativa alinhada ao conceito de pay-performance sensitivity, evidenciando que os instrumentos de governanca corporativa nao atuam de forma isolada, mas sim de maneira entrelacada e interdependente. Design/metodologia/abordagem: A amostra do estudo e composta das empresas participantes do Indice Brasil 100 (IBRX 100) listadas na B3 no periodo de 2014 a 2018. Os dados foram extraidos da base Economatica[R] e dos formularios de referenda acessados no site da Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios (CVM). O metodo utilizado para analise dos dados foi regressao com dados em painel, adotando modelos de efeitos fixos e aleatorios. Resultados: Os resultados evidenciam que a composicao do conselho (representada pela dualidade de funcoes entre CEO e presidente do conselho) aumenta a sensibilidade da remuneracao dos executivos ao desempenho das empresas, ao passo que a concentracao acionaria a reduz. Ademais, percebeu-se que uma maior presenca de membros independentes no conselho reduz a variacao da remuneracao dos executivos. PALAVRAS-CHAVE Compensacao dos executivos. Composicao do conselho de administracao. Estrutura de propriedade/controle. Governanca corporativa. Pay-performance sensitivity.
1. INTRODUCTION Executive compensation has been frequently investigated with the objective of assessing its determinants (Essen, Otten, & Carberry, 2012) and the influence of the incentives granted to the manager [...]