학술논문

SWEAT THE SMALL STUFF: STRATEGIC SELECTION OF PENSION POLICIES USED TO DEFER REQUIRED CONTRIBUTIONS
Document Type
Report
Source
Contemporary Economic Policy. July 2018, Vol. 36 Issue 3, p505, 21 p.
Subject
Pensions -- Laws, regulations and rules
Defined benefit plans -- Analysis
Business
Economics
Government regulation
Analysis
Laws, regulations and rules
Language
English
ISSN
1074-3529
Abstract
The administrators of state-sponsored defined benefit public pension plans have considerable discretion to determine the accounting and actuarial parameters used to calculate the normal cost contributions and amortization payments that, together, comprise the sponsoring state's annual required contribution amount. Using longitudinal data from the Public Pension Database and a fixed effects approach, we find evidence that suggests plan administrators decisions about cost and amortization methods are influenced by the normal cost and amortization payments, respectively. When these costs increase, administrators tend to use less prudent methods that defer, or keep low, the pension contributions required from the state while, simultaneously, and perversely, improving the appearance of the plan's funded status and the state's funding discipline. (JEL H75)
I. INTRODUCTION Across the United States, state-sponsored defined benefit pension plans lack sufficient assets to meet their future obligations to workers. Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli (2014) estimate that plans, on [...]