부산대학교 도서관

This paper is to critically review the ‘post-metaphysical’ view of M. Balaguer viewing that a problem of free will is a problem of empirical science, and whether there exists a free will in the meaning of event causal libertarianism can be discerned in a empirical scientific manner. According to Balaguer, any metaphysical problems is either one of 1) a problem of empirical science, 2) a logical problem, or 3) a meaningless problem, and a problem of free will falls under problems of empirical science. He asserts that there exist undetermined events, i.e., ‘torn decisions’, and that the truth or falsehood thereof can be discerned by neuroscience. This paper shows that the event causal libertarianism of Balaguer is largely faced with three problems. Firstly, an ‘application problem’ occurs as all core concepts of the Balaguer-defined event causal libertarianism cannot be the subjects of empirical scientific investigation. Secondly, it is questionable that the identical relations between individual mental events neural events are discernable. Thirdly, as ‘any practical reason’ among reasons for action is not a mental state, it cannot be identified by only considering for the neural state.