부산대학교 도서관

This study focused implementation stage in the reorganization procedures. According to the empirical study, because there is no limit to the extension of the extension period of implementation, the debtor can abuse the reorganization procedure. Therefore, the China’s Bankruptcy Law shall give requirements specifically and definitely for the extension of the reorganization plan. According to the Article 87 of the China’s Bankruptcy Law, the provision that the court should judge the feasibility of the Business plan. However, in the reorganization plan of a listed company in China, the court approves the reorganization plan even though the business plans are often too simple and not feasible. This study also finds that the implementation’s ending of the listed company reorganization is mostly Back Door Listing. In the case of applying regenerative type reorganization, the content of the business plan places more emphasis on the feasibility, but the business plan presented in the regeneration plan is of no practical significance when the acquisition type reorganization is implemented. Therefore, in Article 87 of the China’s Bankruptcy Law, the provision that the court should judge whether the feasibility of the management plan exists or not is not really meaningful. The M&A or Back Door Listing completed by the reorganized listed company is more likely to receive the approval of the appellation compared to the M&A or backdoor listing conducted by the listed company without entering the regeneration procedure. The government have a strong incentive to promote the listed company’s reorganization proceeding, and the Creditors' rights may be infringed for this reason. Thus, the prevention of excessive intervention of the local government is suggested. In addition, the same criteria as the non-listed company should be used by the China's Securities Regulatory Commission in the examination of material assets reorganization and a Back Door Listing.