부산대학교 도서관

“Seeing is believing” means that we see something first, and later higher-level cognitive activities such as believing or knowing are applicable to seeing. However, “we see as much as we know” implies that seeing and knowing are inseperable. Dennett uses a painting which contains tiny people when we see from a distance. But just paint bulbs or touches are recognized when we see it very closely. He argues that we see these paint bulbs, suggesting real people, as people by filling-in which is a sort of judgment. Judgment, which is a conceptual process, in perception implies that perceptual content is conceptual. On the other hand, Dretske claims that perceptual experiences, inaccessible by cognitive activities, are found. The change blindness shows that we are not aware of a salient difference between two very similar pictures. This involves that nonconceptual content, detachable from judgment or inference, exists. By examining not only these examples but also further empirical cases such as blindsight, Sperling’s experiments, and crowding, I argue Dretske’s view is more plausible than Dennett’s.