부산대학교 도서관

How to strategically allocate resources against opponents is a central component in adversarial decision-making. Moreover, informational asymmetries often exist between competitors and can significantly impact outcomes. In this letter, we study General Lotto games under varying levels of informational asymmetry between two players. The General Lotto game is a popular model of competitive resource allocation, in which opposing players compete over a set of valuable battlefields. We consider information here as knowledge of the battlefield values, which are randomly drawn from a finite distribution. First, we consider a class of games in which one player observes all realized values, and the opponent does not observe any. We then consider scenarios where the opponent observes a subset of the realized values. In both settings, we completely characterize equilibrium payoffs and strategies. We then provide improvement factors that result from acquiring information, demonstrating that information can significantly improve one’s competitive performance.