학술논문

Defeating Silicon Reverse Engineering Using a Layout-Level Standard Cell Camouflage
Document Type
Periodical
Source
IEEE Transactions on Consumer Electronics IEEE Trans. Consumer Electron. Consumer Electronics, IEEE Transactions on. 65(1):109-118 Feb, 2019
Subject
Power, Energy and Industry Applications
Components, Circuits, Devices and Systems
Fields, Waves and Electromagnetics
Logic gates
Standards
Layout
Reverse engineering
IP networks
Tools
Libraries
Layout camouflage
standard cell
reverse engineering
critical path
Language
ISSN
0098-3063
1558-4127
Abstract
Intellectual property protection techniques face a challenging task in countering a physical attack by reverse engineering the netlist of an embedded integrated circuit. An attacker can extract sensitive information with image tools by processing microphotographs at low metal layers of delayered chips. We propose a low performance and zero-area impact method to obfuscate circuits by using a current digital design flow with a layout standard cell generator to obtain different physical versions of the same logic cell. Results indicate that timing and power overhead, introduced by the obfuscation method, can be mitigated. After applying the method to a set of benchmark circuits and a 32-bit RISC-based microprocessor, results show a 40%–50% average obfuscation with zero area penalty and less than 2% timing and power penalty for system level blocks. Considering that most attacks direct reverse engineering to key cryptographic functions, experimental obfuscation results indicate a timing penalty of 4% with a strong obfuscation level for a synthesized key establishment core.