부산대학교 도서관

Lately, differential privacy (DP) has been introduced in cooperative multiagent reinforcement learning (CMARL) to safe-guard the agents' privacy against adversarial inference during knowledge sharing. Nevertheless, we argue that the noise introduced by DP mechanisms may inadvertently give rise to a novel poisoning threat, specifically in the context of private knowledge sharing during CMARL, which remains unexplored in the literature. To address this shortcoming, we present an adaptive, privacy-exploiting, and evasion-resilient localized poisoning attack (PeLPA) that capitalizes on the inherent DP-noise to circumvent anomaly detection systems and hinder the optimal convergence of the CMARL model. We rigorously evaluate our proposed PeLPA attack in diverse environments, encompassing both non-adversarial and multiple-adversarial contexts. Our findings reveal that, in a medium-scale environment, the PeLPA attack with attacker ratios of 20% and 40% can lead to an increase in average steps to goal by 50.69% and 64.41%, respectively. Furthermore, under similar conditions, PeLPA can result in a 1.4x and 1.6x computational time increase in optimal reward attainment and a 1.18x and 1.38x slower convergence for attacker ratios of 20% and 40%, respectively.