부산대학교 도서관

This paper investigates the security of commands in cyber-physical systems at the supervisory control layer from an attacker's perspective. With observation capabilities comparable to the supervisor, the attacker can deliberately intercept and modify commands to disrupt the control logic and inflict damage or blockage upon the system. It is worth noting that we consider the issue of command security in systems that utilize event-based scheduling for the first time. In this system, sensors transmit readings at specific intervals, and the supervisor can consecutively send commands within these intervals. Within this context, we propose a novel architecture called the Command Attack Structure (CAS) within the framework of discrete event systems, which provides detailed insight into attack processes within the supervisory control layer. In addition, we also develop a CAS construction algorithm that guarantees the inclusion of all possible attacks. And the attacker can achieve the damage-infliction goal and the blocking-reachable goal by selecting specific attacks.