학술논문

Improved Fault Analysis on Subterranean 2.0
Document Type
Periodical
Source
IEEE Transactions on Computers IEEE Trans. Comput. Computers, IEEE Transactions on. 73(6):1631-1639 Jun, 2024
Subject
Computing and Processing
Ciphers
Encryption
Fault location
Registers
Time complexity
Correlation coefficient
Computers
Fault analysis
neural network
correlation coefficient
signature
Language
ISSN
0018-9340
1557-9956
2326-3814
Abstract
Subterranean 2.0, a NIST second round lightweight cryptographic primitive, was introduced by Daemen et al. in 2020. It has three modes of operation: Subterranean-SAE, Subterranean- deck , and Subterranean-XOF. So far, most of the existing practical-time implementable attacks on Subterranean-SAE fall under the nonce misuse setting scenario. In this paper, we present significantly improved Differential Fault Analysis on Subterranean-SAE and Subterranean- deck . We consider a more challenging framework of unknown fault injection round, and achieve improved execution time as well as data complexity over the best known fault attack available in the literature. We utilize deep neural networks and also correlation coefficient for generation of signatures and matching them. Two general frameworks are proposed for fault location identification assuming that fault injection round is unknown. Finally, we use a $SAT$SAT solver to efficiently recover the embedded encryption key with no more than $\mathbf{5}$5 distinct faults. Experimental results reveal that the total time (online phase) required to mount the attack on Subterranean-SAE (Subterranean- deck ) is 1234.6 (1334.6) seconds.