학술논문

Performing Security Proofs of Stateful Protocols
Document Type
Conference
Source
2021 IEEE 34th Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF) CSF Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), 2021 IEEE 34th. :1-16 Jun, 2021
Subject
Communication, Networking and Broadcast Technologies
Components, Circuits, Devices and Systems
Computing and Processing
Protocols
Automation
Computational modeling
Computer bugs
Tools
Specification languages
Complexity theory
stateful-security-protocols
interactive-theorem-proving
automated-verification
Language
ISSN
2374-8303
Abstract
In protocol verification we observe a wide spectrum from fully automated methods to interactive theorem proving with proof assistants like Isabelle/HOL. The latter provide overwhelmingly high assurance of the correctness, which automated methods often cannot: due to their complexity, bugs in such automated verification tools are likely and thus the risk of erroneously verifying a flawed protocol is non-negligible. There are a few works that try to combine advantages from both ends of the spectrum: a high degree of automation and assurance. We present here a first step towards achieving this for a more challenging class of protocols, namely those that work with a mutable long-term state. To our knowledge this is the first approach that achieves fully automated verification of stateful protocols in an LCF-style theorem prover. The approach also includes a simple user-friendly transaction-based protocol specification language embedded into Isabelle, and can also leverage a number of existing results such as soundness of a typed model