학술논문

金融分权影响民营企业融资约束的途径:一个补充讨论 / The Way of Financial Decentralization Influencing Private-owned Enterprises'Financial Constraints:A Supplementary Discussion
Document Type
Academic Journal
Source
当代经济科学 / Modern Economic Science. 46(1):16-29
Subject
金融分权
地方银行
民营企业
融资约束
产业升级
地方政府
financial decentralization
district banks
private-owned enterprises
financial constraints
industrial upgrading
local government
Language
Chinese
ISSN
1002-2848
Abstract
从中国金融分权实施形式出发,分析地方银行作为金融分权的具体机构对民营企业融资约束的影响.首先,地方银行的建立确实会增加民营企业的信贷比率,但存在显著的地区差异,在经济发达、地方国有企业积极推进产业升级的地区这种促进作用更为显著.进一步研究发现,在切实缓解民营企业融资约束方面,重要的不是地方银行规模增加而是银行控制权结构优化,由地方政府向市场控制分权越多,越有利于缓解民营企业融资约束.从城市商业银行入手详细探讨银行控制权变化对其信贷倾向的影响,发现随着地方政府的退出和民营股权的增加,城市商业银行信贷中的民营企业信贷占比会显著增加.但是,并非地方政府退出程度越高越好,在发达地区地方政府过度退出反而不利;相反,在欠发达地区地方政府需要更大程度地退出才能有效促进城市商业银行为民营企业融资.因此,在适当扩大地方银行规模的基础上,优化其控制权结构和加快地方产业升级是缓解民营企业融资约束的关键之举.
During China's ongoing phase of industrial upgrading,state-owned enterprises(SOEs)continue to play a dominant role in capital-intensive industrial transformations.Private-owned enterprises(POEs)face credit constraints influenced by both squeeze-in and squeeze-out effects,with the extent of financial constraints determined by the dominant entity.A crucial factor in this dynamic is financial decentralization(FD).Macroscopically,FD does alleviate financial constraints for POEs,but its effectiveness is contingent on the pace of industrial upgrading.The specific approaches to FD implementation and their impact on POEs'financial constraints are key considerations. China's credit market exhibits a stratification by ownership type.Large state-owned commercial banks cater to the financing needs of centralized enterprises,local government-controlled banks support local SOEs,and privately-controlled banks primarily finance POEs.Establishing district banks can be viewed as a decentralization strategy,with FD-Ⅰ involving decentralization from central to local levels and FD-Ⅱ reflecting a decentralization strategy from local government to the market.This study poses specific research questions:Does the establishment of district banks enhance POEs'credit access,and does a shift in district banks'control structure significantly ease the financial constraints of POEs? Drawing data from various sources,this study conducts empirical tests from both the firms'and banking perspectives.Analysis of credit ratios among SME-listed POEs reveals that the development of district banks improves credit ratios,with joint-stock banks(JSBs)having a more significant impact in developed regions,and city commercial banks(CCBs)being more prominent ineconomically underdeveloped areas.Cash-cash flow sensitivity testing indicates that increased decentralization among district banks effectively eases financial constraints of POEs.Additionally,the exit of local government promotes CCBs to lend to POEs.Furthermore,in developed regions experiencing rapid industrial upgrading,a judicious government exit proves adequate.Conversely,in economically underdeveloped areas,a more substantial government exit becomes imperative.This implies that effectively addressing the financial constraints of POEs requires not only optimal industrial upgrading but also a robust implementation of FD.This finding holds considerable reference value for local governments aiming to support SMEs through district banks.These efforts should account for local industrial planning,consider the industrial positioning of both SOEs and POEs,and establish a locally adapted division of control within the banks while appropriately decentralizing to the market. This research underscores the impact of FD on POEs'financial constraints through three methods:the"scale way",involving the establishment of local financial institutions to increase local financial resources(FD-Ⅰ);the"control way",reallocating financial resources and control to the market by reducing local government influence(FD-Ⅱ);and the"industrial way",where SOEs actively guide industrial upgrading,exit industries where POEs have competitive advantages,and enhance POEs'financing ability.