학술논문

Secure Incentivization for Decentralized Content Delivery
Document Type
Working Paper
Source
Subject
Computer Science - Networking and Internet Architecture
Language
Abstract
Prior research has proposed technical solutions to use peer-to-peer (P2P) content delivery to serve Internet video, showing that it can reduce costs to content providers. Yet, such methods have not become widespread except for a few niche instances. An important challenge is incentivization: what tangible benefits does P2P content delivery offer users who bring resources to the table? In this paper, we ask whether monetary incentives can help attract peers in P2P content delivery systems. We commissioned a professional survey of people around theUnited States to answer several relevant questions. We found that 51% of the 876 respondents--substantially larger than our expectations--answered "yes" to whether they would participate for suitable financial incentives. Encouraged by the results of the survey, we propose Gringotts, a system to structure incentives and securely incorporate P2P delivery into content delivery systems. Gringotts provides a novel Proof of Delivery mechanism that allows content providers to verify correct delivery of their files, and shows how to use cryptocurrency to pay peers while guarding against liars and Sybil attacks.