학술논문

Maximizing NFT Incentives: References Make You Rich
Document Type
Working Paper
Source
Subject
Computer Science - Computer Science and Game Theory
Computer Science - Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science
Computer Science - Cryptography and Security
Computer Science - Computers and Society
Economics - General Economics
Language
Abstract
In this paper, we study how to optimize existing Non-Fungible Token (NFT) incentives. Upon exploring a large number of NFT-related standards and real-world projects, we come across an unexpected finding. That is, the current NFT incentive mechanisms, often organized in an isolated and one-time-use fashion, tend to overlook their potential for scalable organizational structures. We propose, analyze, and implement a novel reference incentive model, which is inherently structured as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)-based NFT network. This model aims to maximize connections (or references) between NFTs, enabling each isolated NFT to expand its network and accumulate rewards derived from subsequent or subscribed ones. We conduct both theoretical and practical analyses of the model, demonstrating its optimal utility.