학술논문
Optimal Strategies in Zero-Sum Repeated Games with Incomplete Information: The Dependent Case
Document Type
Article
Source
Dynamic Games and Applications; 20240101, Issue: Preprints p1-17, 17p
Subject
Language
ISSN
21530785; 21530793
Abstract
Using the duality techniques introduced by De Meyer (Math Oper Res 21:209–236, 1996a, Math Oper Res 21:237–251, 1996b), Rosenberg (Int J Game Theory 27:577–597, 1998) and De Meyer and Marino (Cahiers de la MSE 27, 2005) provided an explicit construction for optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information on both sides, in the independent case. In this note, we extend both the duality techniques and the construction of optimal strategies to the dependent case.