학술논문
Optimal Financial Contracts for a Start-Up with Unlimited Operating Discretion.
Document Type
Article
Author
Source
Subject
*Stock purchase agreements (Close corporations)
*Strategic alliances (Business)
*Small business finance
*Risk aversion
*Corporate debt financing
*Small business
*Contracts
*Business networks
*Going public (Securities)
*Options (Finance)
Sociology of risk
Equity (Law)
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Language
ISSN
0022-1090
Abstract
The model presented here shows that extreme uncertainty between an entrepreneur and potential investors can lead to the exclusive use of equity and riskless debt for small business financing. The paper derives these results without any restrictions on the available contract space, the distribution function governing a project's payoff, or the risk aversion of most potential entrepreneurs. In addition, the model produces predictions regarding the "under-pricing" of securities to outside financiers, the order in which firms will issue securities, and the relationship between the types of securities a firm will issue and its available collateral. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]