부산대학교 도서관

Unconventional oil and gas (UOG) production has reinvigorated US production while creating conflicts over governance and environmental injustices. Here, we focus on relationships among power, regulatory conflict, and procedural justice around UOG by examining the Colorado Oil and Gas Task Force (TF) and its decision‐making processes. Instead of statewide voting on UOG ballot measures, Colorado convened a 21‐member TF tasked with making regulatory recommendations. We draw on interviews, participant observation, and policy ethnography to examine: who sets the rules of the game, how players are chosen, and by whom. We ask the following questions: (1) How did TF members and other political actors exert state and institutional power, and how did that shape the structure, composition, processes, and outcomes of the TF?; (2) As a state‐created body, how did the TF and its internal processes disrupt or reinforce power relations favoring industry and fossil fuel development?; and (3) What were the procedural justice implications of TF processes? We advance scholarship on procedural justice by demonstrating how people operate at institutional scales to shape decision‐making structures, processes, and outcomes. We show how nonelected bodies can work as state interventions for industry, reinforcing industry power and procedural injustices rather than disrupting them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]