학술논문
THE RELATIVE MERITS OF COURTS AND AGENCIES IN COMPETITION LAW--INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: ADMINISTRATIVE MODELS; JUDICIAL MODELS; AND MIXED MODELS.
Document Type
Article
Author
Source
Subject
*COURT system
*GOVERNMENT agencies
*ANTITRUST law
*JUSTICE administration
*FINES (Penalties)
*MERGERS & acquisitions
*INDUSTRIAL management
*JUDGES
*ADMINISTRATIVE law
*SOCIETIES
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Language
ISSN
1744-1056
Abstract
The article discusses the relative merits of courts and administrative agencies in competition law administration and enforcement and determines the differences of both. It first examines the enormous power held by courts and agencies like the power to impose fines, block mergers or impose certain onerous condition and to alter entire industries. With this, it notes the relevance of efficient and effective legal regime to the proper functioning of any competition law, such as how judges and agencies use their powers. Moreover, the article tackles the factors that can influence the process, such as the political interference and political perception.