부산대학교 도서관

This article aims to study the Federated Malay States' (FMS) financial crisis which occurred between the year 1920 and 1924. The formation of the FMS and the Federal Council (FC) allowed the British government to control the federal financial administration through the British High Commissioner. This financial administration aimed to legalise all financial contributions from FMS to the British government. However, by the end of 1920, the British financial administration in FMS faced a deficit problem in the federal financial balances. The crisis grew serious after the FMS Government had no cash balance by the end of 1921. The early researchers concurred that the over-centralisation of the financial administration by FMS government between 1913 and 1919 was the main reason for the financial crisis. Contrary to that, the evidence obtained from the FMS financial and administrative records, the FC Proceedings, the Retrenchment Commission Report, CO 717 and FCO 141 documents showed a growing financial surplus before the year 1920. In order to resolve this problem, the objective of the article is to re-evaluate the FMS financial crisis factor. The findings show that the over-centralisation of the administration of finance was not the real factor that caused the FMS financial crisis. There is strong evidence showing that the failure of Laurence N. Guillemard as the British High Commissioner to understand FMS government's account led to the financial crisis. Nevertheless, the solution by Guillemard since 1922 has solved the FMS's financial crisis due to the rapidly growing FMS financial surplus in 1924. Hence, this article argues that the overcentralisation of finance was not the main reason for the FMS financial crisis between the year 1920 and 1924. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]