학술논문

Extending Trade Law Precedent.
Document Type
Article
Source
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law. May2021, Vol. 54 Issue 3, p539-586. 48p.
Subject
*LEGAL precedent
*INTERSTATE agreements
*DISPUTE resolution
*INTERNATIONAL conflict
*INTERNATIONAL courts
Language
ISSN
0090-2594
Abstract
Precedent is celebrated as a fundamental feature of dense legal systems as it creates predictability, builds coherence, and enhances the authority of courts and tribunals. But, in international adjudication, precedent can also affect interstate cooperation and ultimately the legitimacy of international organizations. Wary of clashing with state interests, most international dispute settlement systems are designed so that rulings do not set obligatory precedent. This Article describes the role of precedent in the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to explain how precedent can affect compliance with the decisions of international courts and tribunals (ICs). This Article makes two main contributions. First, it shows that there can be precedent without a formal stare decisis rule. In theory the AB has a rule against binding precedent. Based on empirical evidence, however, this Article shows that the AB has in fact a strong norm of relying on prior decisions. Second, it shows that over time, the Precedent is celebrated as a fundamental feature of dense legal systems as it creates predictability, builds coherence, and enhances the authority of courts and tribunals. But, in international adjudication, precedent can also affect interstate cooperation and ultimately the legitimacy of international organizations. Wary of clashing with state interests, most international dispute settlement systems are designed so that rulings do not set obligatory precedent. This Article describes the role of precedent in the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to explain how precedent can affect compliance with the decisions of international courts and tribunals (ICs). This Article makes two main contributions. First, it shows that there can be precedent without a formal stare decisis rule. In theory the AB has a rule against binding precedent. Based on empirical evidence, however, this Article shows that the AB has in fact a strong norm of relying on prior decisions. Second, it shows that over time, the [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]