학술논문
Robustness and Conceptual Analysis in Evolutionary Game Theory.
Document Type
Article
Author
Source
Subject
*GAME theory
*GAME-theoretical semantics
*SIMULATION games
*CONDITIONAL expectations
*ROBUST control
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Language
ISSN
0031-8248
Abstract
A variety of robustness objections have been made against evolutionary game theory. One of these objections alleges that the games used in the underlying model are too arbitrary and oversimplified to generate a robust model of interesting prosocial behaviors. In this paper, I argue that the robustness objection can be met. However, in order to do so, we must attend to important conceptual issues regarding the nature of fairness, justice, and other moral concepts. Specifically, we must better understand the relationship between moral concepts and formal characterizations of games [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]