학술논문

Auction-Based Resource Allocation Mechanism in Federated Cloud Environment: TARA
Document Type
Periodical
Source
IEEE Transactions on Services Computing IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. Services Computing, IEEE Transactions on. 15(1):470-483 Jan, 2022
Subject
Computing and Processing
General Topics for Engineers
Cloud computing
Resource management
Economics
Computational modeling
Quality of service
Biological system modeling
Simulation
cloud federation
double auction
resource allocation
truthfulness
Language
ISSN
1939-1374
2372-0204
Abstract
The growing market of cloud computing resulted in increased demand for cloud resources and it will become difficult for individual service providers (SPs) to fulfill all resource requests. That leads to a situation where two or more SPs may form a group (federation) and share the resources in order to fulfill the cloud users’ demand and gain economic advantage. Now, due to the formation of more than one federations by different cloud providers, it may be difficult for users to select a suitable federation who can deliver cloud services at a fair price. In this context, it is necessary to have a framework that will efficiently allocate resources of cloud federations to the users at a fair price and stop market manipulation. In this article, we propose a multi-unit double auction mechanism called TARA ( T ruthful Double A uction for R esource A llocation) that can be used to efficiently choose cloud federations for users from which they can get resources. Here, we consider a multi-seller and multi-buyer double auction mechanism for heterogeneous resources, where every buyer submits their bids and every seller places their ask (the price of a resource that is offered by a federation). TARA achieves some important properties like truthfulness (also known as incentive compatibility), individual rationality and budget balance for both buyers and sellers. TARA is also computationally efficient and posses high system efficiency. The simulation results also show that total utility of buyer is more than some existing double auction mechanisms.