학술논문

A Periodic Allocation Mechanism for Allocating Demand Response Reserves Deployed by Multiple Ancillary Services
Document Type
Periodical
Source
IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy IEEE Trans. Sustain. Energy Sustainable Energy, IEEE Transactions on. 15(2):1086-1099 Apr, 2024
Subject
Power, Energy and Industry Applications
Geoscience
Computing and Processing
Resource management
Uncertainty
Regulation
Games
Frequency control
Demand response
Costs
K-means clustering
N–N Stackelberg game
reserve allocation mechanism
uncertainty modeling
Language
ISSN
1949-3029
1949-3037
Abstract
High penetration of renewable energy resources poses technical and economic challenges to system operation. Utilizing demand response to provide ancillary services is beneficial to the security of the grid, but for this, an adequate level of reserves to support possible ancillary services is required. Reasonable allocation of the demand response reserves (DRREs) deployed by different ancillary services can guarantee performance and participant profits during ancillary service provision. An allocation mechanism that periodically allocates DRREs for various ancillary services considering uncertainty and demand response resource (DRR) sufficiency is proposed to address this problem. The participants include purchasers and providers of DRRs. First, K-means clustering is used to obtain the occurrence characteristics of different ancillary service events. Second, the utility functions of the participants in the allocation process are modeled while fully considering the uncertainty in periodic allocation. Then, different types of Stackelberg games are formulated to determine the DRREs deployed by different ancillary services under different DRR sufficiency situations. Finally, an intraday scheduling method is presented to optimize the use of the allocated DRREs and achieve the expected regulation performance. Simulations verify the effectiveness of the proposed allocation mechanism in terms of achieving a win-win situation for all participants.