부산대학교 도서관

[80] Jenkins, then, saw how the assumptions held by terrorism's audience racialized these disparate actors and the trouble that created; yet he displayed little concern that experts in the "terrorism industry" had contributed to these perceptions.[81] While RAND's chronology of international terrorism was one way of creating the figure of the terrorist, RAND's simulation of future terrorism was another. He contended that the attraction for terrorists in "going nuclear" was not in causing "mass casualties", but in "the fact that almost any terrorist action associated with the words "atomic" or "nuclear" automatically generates fear in the mind of the public."[53] The most likely threat posed by nuclear terrorists, wrote Jenkins, was the "creation of potentially alarming hoaxes" i.e. the use of pre-existent fears to heighten the effects of the next performance.[54] It was in imagining terrorists going nuclear that Jenkins formulated his aphorism: "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." Jenkins and Johnson affirmed that "governments may also employ terrorism at home and abroad", but the chronology excluded "incidents of state terrorism" because "such terrorism tends to be internal rather than international." "Ironically", Jenkins saw, "while extensive media coverage tends to magnify individual terrorist episodes, continuing coverage ultimately deflates their effect by making them commonplace."[59] "We ought not to be too surprised", Jenkins concluded, if terrorists "alter their targets or their tactics" to affect their audiences, which might produce more deadly terrorism.[60] Nevertheless, Jenkins remained convinced that the principle that terrorists wanted "a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead" would maintain. [Extracted from the article]