소장자료
LDR | 01898cam a22002654a 4500 | ||
001 | 0092061593▲ | ||
005 | 20180520185105▲ | ||
008 | 120731s2012 ne b 001 0 eng ▲ | ||
010 | ▼a2012376576▲ | ||
020 | ▼a9789042034389▲ | ||
035 | ▼a(KERIS)REF000016876915▲ | ||
040 | ▼aDLC▼cDLC▼d221016▲ | ||
042 | ▼apcc▲ | ||
050 | 0 | 0 | ▼aBJ1533.F8▼bM58 2012▲ |
082 | 0 | 0 | ▼a177/.62▼221▲ |
090 | ▼a177.62▼bM684f▲ | ||
100 | 1 | ▼aMitias, Michael H.▲ | |
245 | 1 | 0 | ▼aFriendship :▼ba central moral value /▼cMichael H. Mitias.▲ |
260 | ▼aAmsterdam ;▼aNew York :▼bRodopi,▼cc2012.▲ | ||
300 | ▼a233 ;▼c22 cm.▲ | ||
490 | 0 | ▼aVIBS, Value inquiry book series ;▼vv. 239▲ | |
504 | ▼aIncludes bibliographical references (p. [227]-229) and index.▲ | ||
520 | ▼a"Friendship was recognized as a central moral value in the classical period, but it was dismissed from medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. This book argues that this dismissal is unjustifiable. The validity of this claim is established in four steps. First, it proposes the concept of moral paradigm. This concept enables us to explore the source of moral value and to provide a criterion for the evaluation of the adequacy of moral theory. Second, the book explains why medieval, modern and twentieth century moral theorists neglected friendship as a central moral value in their analysis of moral behavior and why this neglect was unjustifiable. Third, it explains why the classical moral philosophers viewed friendship as a central moral value. Fourth, it argues that friendship is an ontological need, therefore, a necessary condition of the moral life. This need is implicitly recognized in the moral paradigms that underlie the moral theories of the medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. Accordingly it cannot be neglected in the process of moral theorizing."--Publisher's description.▲ | ||
650 | 0 | ▼aFriendship.▲ | |
999 | ▼c정영주▲ |
Friendship :a central moral value
자료유형
국외단행본
서명/책임사항
Friendship : a central moral value / Michael H. Mitias.
발행사항
Amsterdam ; New York : Rodopi , c2012.
형태사항
233 ; 22 cm.
총서사항
VIBS, Value inquiry book series ; v. 239
서지주기
Includes bibliographical references (p. [227]-229) and index.
요약주기
"Friendship was recognized as a central moral value in the classical period, but it was dismissed from medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. This book argues that this dismissal is unjustifiable. The validity of this claim is established in four steps. First, it proposes the concept of moral paradigm. This concept enables us to explore the source of moral value and to provide a criterion for the evaluation of the adequacy of moral theory. Second, the book explains why medieval, modern and twentieth century moral theorists neglected friendship as a central moral value in their analysis of moral behavior and why this neglect was unjustifiable. Third, it explains why the classical moral philosophers viewed friendship as a central moral value. Fourth, it argues that friendship is an ontological need, therefore, a necessary condition of the moral life. This need is implicitly recognized in the moral paradigms that underlie the moral theories of the medieval, modern, and twentieth century moral theories. Accordingly it cannot be neglected in the process of moral theorizing."--Publisher's description.
ISBN
9789042034389
청구기호
177.62 M684f
소장정보
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