학술논문

The Influence of Seller’s Unilateral Concession Patterns on Buyer’s Perception in Negotiation
Document Type
Dissertation/ Thesis
Author
Source
Subject
distributive negotiations
unilateral concessions
reservation price
signaling
perception
reactive devaluation
Language
English
Abstract
Concessions play a pivotal role in negotiation, exerting a substantial influence on both procedural aspects and ultimate outcomes of such negotiations. This study investigates the ramifications of counterpart concession behaviors on negotiators’ price judgments and satisfaction levels in distributive negotiations. Employing a scenario-based experimental design, three concession models – namely, decreasing gradual concession, consistent gradual concession, and immediate concession – are established. The findings reveal that, in contrast to an immediate concession approach, adopting a strategy of decreasing gradual concessions leads to increased satisfaction with the negotiation outcome and a more favorable evaluation of value estimates among participants acting as buyers. Moreover, the results underscore the nuanced impact of concession patterns on negotiators’ satisfaction and value estimation, contingent upon the recipient’s perception of the counterpart’s reservation price.