부산대학교 도서관

Political coalitions, in their quest to secure reelection, attempt to bias the system against challengers. When they are successful, coalitions may dominate government for multiple terms, even decades. But history has shown us that in the vast majority of the cases, long reigning regimes eventually fall. In this essay I seek to explain why by presenting the conditions under which governing coalitions retain or lose power. A broad range of political science literature addresses this question. Numerous case studies of the collapse of empires give us insight into the factors leading to regime decline. Additionally a vast amount of political science research investigates the causes of the incumbency advantage factors leading to realignment of partisan loyalties, and the characteristics that influence the duration of parliamentary governments. The theory of regime decline that I present in this paper draws on these varied bodies of existing work. I provide evidence for the theory using qualitative and quantitative data from 16 American cities where there is extensive variation in institutions and systems of governance. I argue that systems incumbent coalitions build to protect power are inherently stable, but vary in ability to adapt to exogenous changes, or flexibility. Highly inflexible systems shield incumbent coalitions from relatively small changes in popular opinion, demographic shifts, or varying levels of resources. More flexible systems require coalitions to respond to short term variation in order to maintain power. However, when an exogenous shock to the system is large, inflexible systems too entrenched to adapt are more likely to fall. Thus the probability of retaining power in the face of a powerful shock to the system is directly related to its flexibility. Flexibility depends on the institutional structure of the system, the presence of irreconcilable differences among coalition members, and the degree of hierarchical control within the coalition. Exogenous shocks affect the monetary, political or electoral cost of maintaining control in the status quo system. Decline of a long reigning regime occurs when an incumbent coalition, faced with increased costs, is unable to renegotiate an equilibrium position to deflect challengers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]